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NOTES
A BRAVE NEW WORLD: COMPLYING
WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE
ON PERSONAL PRIVACY THROUGH THE
POWER OF CONTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The old adage "knowledge is power"' has been professed
throughout the ages. However, never before in history has the
ability to accumulate, manipulate and disseminate information
existed on the scale it does today.2 In recent years, informa-
tion of the most personal nature3 can be accessed through
scientific breakthroughs such as DNA testing4 and distributed
globally via the Internet. The tremendous impact on society of
1. Attributed to Frances Bacon, Med. Sacrae: de Haeresibus. See M. FRANCES
MCNAMARA, 2000 CLASSIC LEGAL QUOTATIONS 330 (1992).
2. Based on a 1994 estimate, computers in the United States alone hold five
billion records, trading information on every individual at an average of five times
per day. The credit industry accounts for 400 million files which are updated by
more than two billion entries every month in order to make possible 1.5 million
credit decisions daily. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2
(1997). See also Steven A. Bibas, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY 591 (1994).
3. See Frederic Golden, Good Eggs, Bad Eggs, TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 58.
4. Id. Some of the genetically linked disorders that can currently be detected
through DNA testing are: cystic fibrosis, Down's Syndrome, Duchenne muscular
dystrophy, hemophilia A, Huntington's disease, polycystic kidney disease, and Tay-
Sachs disease. See also KENNETH STARR, THE STARR REPORT: THE OFFICIAL RE-
PORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION OF THE PRESIDENT 57 (1998).
DNA testing was used to determine that the residue on Monica Lewinski's dress
was President Clinton's sperm. According to the report, "the genetic markers on
the semen, which match the President's DNA, are characteristic of one out of 7.87
trillion Caucasians." Id. In the absence of DNA testing the President's sexual rela-
tionship with Ms. Lewinski would have been very difficult to prove, while the
DNA results left no doubt. This is a prime example of how technology affects the
privacy of even the most powerful persons in society. Id.
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this superior accessing and distribution ability was recently
most readily observed by the rapid availability of the Starr
Report' and President Clinton's Grand Jury testimony on vid-
eotape over the Internet. While such technological advances
are indeed a goal for which to strive, these same advances add
urgency to the establishment of adequate safeguards for ensur-
ing the privacy of individuals.
The need for privacy has been recognized by the public'
and addressed to varying degrees by the governments of the
European Union Member countries' and the United States.8
Of specific concern has been the protection of personal data.
With the capacity to convert data into binary form,9 the ability
5. STARR, supra note 4.
6. The issue of privacy has been discussed in such literary works as George
Orwelrs Nineteen Eighty-Four, (depicting control of the public by the government
by virtue of the government's censorship power and constant scrutiny of individu-
als which denied them the power for self-expression), GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN
EIGHTY-FOUR (1949), and cinematic works like Brazil (showing subjugation of the
public to government control by means of governmental control of all information),
BRAZIL (Universal Pictures 1985), and Gattaca (depicting genetic testing being
performed on everyone, and denying of opportunities to achieve their potential to
those with an inferior genetic makeup), GATrACA (Columbia Pictures 1997).
7. For example, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Sweden, and West Germany
already had promulgated various privacy laws. See Patrick E. Cole, New Challeng.
es to the U.S. Multinational Corporation in the European Economic Community:
Data Protection Laws, 17 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 893, 902-08 (1985).
8. In the United States the notion of the right to privacy, or the right to be
"let alone" dates back to the 19th century, and already appeared in a torts trea-
tise at that time, THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed., Chicago, Callaghan
& Co., 1888). The right to be "let alone" as a component of privacy law, however,
received publicity through the publication of the now famous The Right to Privacy
law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Lois D. Brandeis. See Samuel D.
Warren & Lois D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
See also PAUL SCMVARTZ & JOEL REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 37 (1996). Al-
though there is no right to privacy mentioned specifically in the United States
Constitution, the Supreme Court has derived that right from the substantive due
process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments in such seminal cases as Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court has further strength-
ened this concept in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977), identifying two
elements of informational privacy: an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters" and "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions." See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra, at 76, 82-83.
9. Binary form is the conversion of data to its simplest form where all data
is expressed as either zeroes and ones or as ON/OFF. The reduction to a two
state (or binary form) makes it possible to store information on optical or magnet-
ic media by magnetizing/demagnetizing sections of surface to represent the zeroes
and ones or ON/OFF. See A Byte of the Action, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1998, at 96.
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to store"° and use personal data has increased significantly,
thus making the individual's personal information more sus-
ceptible to misuse.
For purposes of brevity, this Note is limited to a discussion
of privacy as it pertains to personal data. Specifically, this
Note focuses on the impact of the passage of the "European
Parliament and Council Directive on the Protection of Individ-
uals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data," commonly referred to as the
European Directive on Data Protection" (Directive), on the
movement of personal data between the European Union and
the United States.
The European Commission has elevated data privacy to a
fundamental right. 2 The Directive is the means for ensuring
that right by governing data privacy requirements. The
Directive's breadth includes the movement of personal data
between the Member States of the European Union, as well as
the movement of such data to countries outside of the Europe-
10. There have been dramatic decreases in storage cost. For example, the
amount of data that can be stored on a square inch of magnetic disk surface has
increased by 60% per year since 1991. This has reduced the cost of storage media
by a factor of 100 (the cost of storing one megabyte has been reduced from $5.00
to $0.05 over the same period). With respect to required space, this permits stor-
age of roughly 340 copies of the 445 page Starr Report onto a cartridge which is
smaller than a book of matches. Id.
11. Council Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 Oct. 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, Council Directive 95/46
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Directive]. The Directive was preceded by the
Common Position (EO) No 1195 with a view to adopting Directive 94/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, 1995 O.J. (C 93) [hereinafter Common Position], and was adopted in its
final state on October 24, 1995. Id.
12. See Fred H. Cate, Privacy and Telecommunications, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 1, 15 (1998). Professor Simitis, speaking at the Annenberg Washington Pro-
gram on Oct. 6, 1994 observed that:
"[tlhe need for the Directive is based on the need to protect human
rights within the Community .... This is why ... we speak. . . of
the necessity to respect the fundamental rights of citizens. Therefore,
data protection may be a subject on which you can have different an-
swers to the various problems, but it is not a subject you can bargain
about."
Id. Professor Semitis, the former Data Protection Commissioner of the German
State of Hesse and Chair of the Council of Europe's Data Protection Experts Com-
mittee, is one of the EUs most distinguished data protection experts. Id.
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an Union, also known as "third countries.""3
The Directive requires that transfers of personal data be
permitted "only if... the third country in question ensures an
adequate level of data protection." 14 The Directive's approach
to cross-border data has in fact been likened to the erection of
a "fence" around Europe. 5 Because the flow of personal data
is an indispensable component of a global economy, 6 some
safety valve was necessary, at least as a stop-gap measure, to
provide an opening through this erected data "fence" in order
to continue the orderly process of international trade. This
safety valve has assumed the form of six exceptions to the
general embargo of data to third countries.
13. In a sense one could infer there is a suggestion that those countries that
do not provide the level of protection required to comply with the Directive are
"third world countries" with respect to data privacy. Indeed countries that do not
comply are referred to as "data protection outlaw nations." As the current laws of
privacy in the United States with respect to data protection are not on par with
the Directive, this would appear to make the United States a "data protection
outlaw nation." See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restric-
tions on International Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471, 484 (1995). It is ironic
that a nation that acknowledged the need for a "right to privacy" in 1890, see
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, no longer finds itself in a leadership role in
guaranteeing these rights, but instead has been relegated to an outcast status.
14. Directive, supra note 11, art. 25(1).
15. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 484 n.94 (quoting from A Commentary by
the UK Data Protection Registrar, in NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DATA PRO-
TECTION REGISTRAR 66-75 (1993) ("If there is to be a Community with an accept-
able and high level of individual data protection . . . it is to be expected that
there will be a fence around the Community with some means of guarding it.")).
16. See REINHARD ELLGER, DER DATENSCHUTZ IM GRENZUEBERSCHREITENDEN
DATENVERKEHR 108-29 (1990). See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 471 n.1. The most
frequent transborder data transfers are:
(1) personnel departments; (2) banks, insurance companies, credit card
companies, and credit bureaus; (3) direct marketing; (4) airlines, travel
agencies, and other businesses involved in the tourist industry; (5) com-
panies that seek to deliver goods to or trade with international custom-
ers; (6) within the public sector: police, customs, tax departments, and
public pension agencies.
Id. For a description of the rapid increase in data flows in the credit card busi-
ness alone, see JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE 230-31
(1974), which discusses the tremendous growth of international data flows. For
example Visa (then BankAmericard) grew from one million cardholders worldwide
to 28.2 million cardholders within the first ten years of existence. Id.
17. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 26(1). The exceptions provided by Section
1 of the article are:
1. the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed
transfer; or
2. the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the
data subject and the controller or the implementation of precontractual
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Some of these exceptions are not applicable to private
enterprise; instead, they focus on the interests of the individu-
al or public policy. However, all the exceptions which are appli-
cable to business transactions fall within a contractual scope.
Thus, the central purpose of this Note is to specifically address
whether these contractual relations are an adequate means for
ensuring data privacy and, if so, whether the contractual ap-
proach should be utilized.
Section II of this Note provides the reader with a funda-
mental perspective on differences between the United States
and the European Union with respect to privacy law, and then
summarizes some of the significant privacy protection goals of
the Directive. Section III briefly discusses the potential impli-
cations of failure by the United States to ensure adequate
protection of personal data. Section IV explains the contracts
exception, which may be used to overcome shortcomings in
U.S. law and examines its applications and shortcomings,
suggesting that the contractual approach is better suited for
large enterprises but problematic for businesses of smaller
size. Section V provides some observations on why the United
States is not prepared to adopt the Directive's approach, but
concludes that greater data protection must be ensured in the
United States because of advances in data processing technolo-
gy and biotechnology.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE-A BRIEF REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL
PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION
The European Union's approach to data privacy differs
measures taken in response to the data subject's request; or
3. the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or for the performance of a
contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the control-
ler and a third party; or
4. the transfer is necessary on important public interest grounds, or for
the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or
5. the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the
data subject; or
6. the transfer is made from a register which according to laws and
regulations is intended to provide information to the public and which is
open to consultation either by the public in general or by any person
who can demonstrate legitimate interest, to the extent that the conditions
laid down in law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case.
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from that of the United States by taking an omnibus approach
to individual rights and giving the state not only an active, but
also pro-active preventive role.'8 The European emphasis is on
the deterrence of harm and accomplishes this by instituting
the necessary control mechanisms for oversight. In contrast,
the United States uses a complex patchwork of laws (the Con-
stitution, federal and state legislation, and state common law)
to address the right to privacy, taking a reactive stance by
legislating in narrow specific areas where problems ,have oc-
curred.19 The U.S. emphasis is on use of remedies for damage
which has already taken place and prevents future harm by
the threat of legal action. This pivotal difference is best ex-
plained by providing a general overview of the histories of
privacy law in the United States and the countries of the Euro-
pean Union.
A. Foundations of Privacy Law in the United States
The United States originated as a group of colonies, many
exercising a significant amount of self-government, that were
formed into a federation of states.0 As is well known, the un-
derlying basis for this configuration was the colonists' fear of a
strong central government.2' As a result, the United States
has a federal government founded upon a Constitution which
established the balance of power between the states, their citi-
zens and the federal government. The focus of the Constitution
itself is the separation of power between the three branches of
the federal government and the authority of the federal gov-
ernment in relation to the states.2 A Bill of Rights was creat-
ed later to address the bulk of citizens' rights."
The rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and later
amendments to the Constitution which relate to the right to
privacy, are the right to freedom of association, voting rights,
protection from unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
18. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 5.
19. Id. at 5-9.
20. JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ITS AMENDMENTS 1 (2d ed. 1997).
21. EDWARD F. COOKE, A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTION 20 (6th
ed. 1995). See also VILE, supra note 20, at 124.
22. See COOKE, supra note 21, at 18, 20.
23. Id. at 19.
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to informational privacy, including avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters, and to independence in decision making.24 Sig-
nificantly, all of these rights protect an individual against the
state, but not against the actions of other citizens. That is, the
government may not infringe on the rights of citizens, but has
no affirmative duty to prevent another citizen from doing so.'
Concomitantly, the rights of individuals against private
parties are primarily found in state tort law.26 By definition,
because tort law varies from state to state such rights do not
protect all U.S. citizens, but are reserved to the inhabitants of
the states that recognize the cause of action. Although priva-
cy law is broadly defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
the Restatement is only secondary, not primary authority, and
thus not binding on the courts of a state unless that state
chooses to follow the guidance of the Restatement.28 Privacy
law in the Restatement encompasses: 1) an unreasonable phys-
ical intrusion upon the seclusion of another;29 2) the appropria-
tion of another's name or likeness; ° 3) unreasonable publicity
given to another's private life;3' and, 4) publicity that unrea-
sonably places another in a false light before the public.32
24. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 44-90.
25. Id. at 32. An exception is the 13th Amendment prohibiting slavery, which
protects the rights of former slaves against individuals, thus limiting private be-
havior. U.S. CONST. amend XIII. See SCHXWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at
32 n.5. See also COOKE, supra note 21, at 180.
26. After the publication of The Right to Privacy by Samuel D. Warren and
Lois D. Brandeis, supra note 8, another seventy years passed before Dean Prosser
analyzed the various state forms of the "right to privacy" and categorized them
into the four torts found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 652A (1976). See also infra Section II.A.
27. See CHRISTINA L. KuNZ ET AL., THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 104-05,
112 (3d ed. 1992).
28. Id. at 7.
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976). Since this tort con-
sists of an unreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of another, it at best applies
to data collection with respect to data privacy. It requires an intrusion into
another's private affairs that is "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id.
30. Id. § 6520. This tort concerns itself with the commercial value inherent in
a person's name or likeness, and thus is of limited value with respect to data
privacy. Most states that recognize this tort require that the appropriation be for
"commercial gain," such as advertising. Id.
31. Id. § 652D. This tort applies when there is a disclosure to a large audi-
ence of private information such that it would be "highly offensive to a reasonable
person" and not be of "legitimate concern to the public." Id.
32. Id. § 652E. A publication to be actionable under this tort must be both
false and highly offensive to the reasonable person. Thus, any information pub-
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With the Great Depression and a shift to a national econo-
my, the federal government began implementing increasingly
broader legislation to stimulate the economy and provide bene-
fits for those in need. Later, however, the legislation covered a
multitude of areas, including those that are related to a
person's right to privacy.33 However, these forays into privacy
law, which can best be described as "ad hoc," have been target-
ed at specific government agencies, economic sectors or indus-
tries, and often address only narrow and specific issues.34 This
has resulted in curiously inconsistent and uneven approaches
to privacy protection. 5
In an attempt to use a uniform approach to the protection
of computer processed information, the Advisory Committee on
Automated Data Systems, a subcommittee of the Health Edu-
cation and Welfare Committee36 issued a report addressing
data protection in 1973." That report, entitled, "Personal Data
Systems: Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens,"
listed five principles which were considered necessary to pro-
tect a person's privacy interest in information collected con-
cerning him."5 The response to the report was the passage of
several statutes 9 which incorporated these principles. Howev-
lished which is true is not actionable and therefore offers no protection for the
privacy of a person. Id.
33. See SC-WARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 7-8.
34. See CATE, supra note 2, at 80. See also SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra
note 8, at 10.
35. See CATE, supra note 2, at 80-81.
36. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is today the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. See DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVA-
CY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES xxi (1989).
37. See Patricia Mell, A Hitchhiker's Guide to Trans-border Data Exchanges
Between EU Member States and the United States Under the European Union
Directive on the Protection of Personal Information, 9 PACE INT'L L. REV. 147, 159
(1997).
38. Id. n.70. The report annunciated five fundamental principles with regard
to an individual's right to privacy: 1) the individual's right to determine what files
exist about him; 2) knowledge how information by the individual will be used; 3)
requirement that the individual consent to broader use of the information than
originally contemplated by the record holder; 4) right of the individual to access
the files and the opportunity by him to correct outdated or incorrect information;
5) files should receive adequate security and should be maintained correctly.
39. Id. n.71. Some of the statutes enacted, which incorporate these principles
were: Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994); Computer Matching and Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (1994); Privacy Protection Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(aa)-(aa)(12) (1994); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994).
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er, because each of these statutes was limited to a specific area
or sector, the resulting protection for the individual was nei-
ther comprehensive nor consistent. This phenomenon is most
evident when one juxtaposes the limited privacy regarding
one's medical condition and treatment with the considerable
protection given to information concerning an individual's
video rentals.0
Another example of the inconsistent privacy protection
phenomenon can be seen in the federal Privacy Act of 197441
(Privacy Act). The Privacy Act is one of the earliest laws gov-
erning data privacy and indeed is quite comprehensive, even
though it only applies to governmental agencies. The Privacy
Act requires government agencies to (1) store only necessary
and relevant information;42 (2) collect that information from
the data subject itself to the extent this is possible;43 (3) main-
tain records with accuracy and completeness;" and (4) protect
the security of records through establishment of administrative
and technical safeguards." While these protections are signifi-
cant and are mirrored by those of the European Directive, the
effectiveness of the Privacy Act is undermined by its many
exclusions. For example, the Privacy Act specifically states
that it does not apply to any information for which disclosure
is required under the Freedom of Information Act.46
In addition to this limitation, the Privacy Act has twelve
exemptions that allow information to be disclosed to other
government agencies, including CongressY.4  The broadest ex-
40. See Shed Alpert, Smart Cards, Smarter Policy: Medical Records, Privacy,
and Health Care Reform, 23 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13, 13 (Nov.-Dec. 1993). Sheri
Alpert is a government policy analyst who summarized the situation as follows:
"video rental records are afforded more federal protection than are medical re-
cords." Id. See also SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 7-11. The Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, also known as the "Bork Bill" came into existence
after a public uproar following the publication of a list of video titles rented by
then federal appellate judge and nominee for the United States Supreme Court,
Robert Bork. See also Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618,
102 Stat. 3195 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710-2711 (1994)).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
42. Id. § 552a(e)(1).
43. Id. § 552a(e)(2).
44. Id. § 552a(e)(5, 6).
45. Id. § 552a(e)(10).
46. Id. § 552a(b)(2). Note that the Freedom of Information Act permits per-
sons access to all agency records, subject to nine exemptions. Id. § 552(b).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)-(12).
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emption of the Privacy Act is for any data requested by anoth-
er government agency for "routine use."48 This exemption has
been used by government agencies to such an extent that it
has prompted Professors Schwartz and Reidenberg to observe
that the "routine use" exemption has been employed to justify
almost "any use" of data.49
In addition to a large number of federal statutes, state law
also protects the citizens of individual states through constitu-
tional and statutory laws."0 A number of state constitutions,
unlike the federal Constitution, expressly protect privacy.5 '
However, like the federal Constitution, such protections are
generally limited to the right of the citizen against the govern-
ment and do not regulate relations between citizens.52
With regard to the statutory provisions of the individual
states, they tend to fall into three categories: (1) some states
have codified the common law torts discussed previously,
thereby creating a general right to privacy; (2) other states
have limited such statutes to one or more of the common law
privacy torts; and (3) yet other states have promulgated indus-
try-specific privacy legislation, which like their federal counter-
parts take a narrow sectoral approach. 3
In the final analysis, the approach to privacy in the United
States has been one of restraint. The result is minimal restric-
tions that ensure a free flow of information. This path is philo-
sophically consistent with the strong tradition of a laissez-faire
state-which calls for minimal interference of government
upon the private sector, and thus allows for the free flow of
48. Id. § 552a(b)(3).
49. See SCIVARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 98.
50. Id. at 9.
51. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1
"All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and priva-
cy."); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, sei-
zures, invasions of privacy").
52. The California Constitution is a rare exception that applies the right of
privacy equally to private parties and the government. See generally Hill v.
N.C.A.A., 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
53. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 227-229 (1992).
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ideas as exemplified by both freedom of speech and protection
of the press.'
B. Foundations of Privacy Law in the European Union
Although it was the United States that originated the
right to privacy, the first data privacy legislation was passed in
Europe, in the German state of Hesse in 1970."5 Today, howev-
er, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom all have broad data protection or privacy statutes.56
The interest in personal privacy in European countries has
its roots in twentieth century European history. It has been
suggested that to some extent the hidden agenda behind the
European data protection laws is Europe's experience in World
War II, and the desire to avoid a recurrence of the type of
population control exercised by the Nazis and the Gestapo.57
Modern day protection of personal information privacy
through the Directive finds its source in Article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (Human Rights Convention),58 which guar-
antees the right of privacy involving "private and family
life... home... and correspondence."59 Although the threat
to personal privacy was recognized by the Human Rights Con-
vention in 1950, the concern for the protection of privacy was
heightened by the expansion of computer use and the associat-
ed shift from an industrial economy to an information econo-
my. 6
0
To ensure that the right to privacy would not be infringed
54. See ScHWARTz & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 6-7.
55. See Cate, supra note 12, at 5.
56. Id.
57. See FLAHERTY, supra note 36, at 373-74. See also Grundgesetz (federal
constitution) [GGI arts. 1, 10, 13 (F.R.G.), showing that the right to privacy was
included in the German Constitution after WWII.
58. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Human
Rights Convention]. The provisions of the Convention are applicable by their own
force and effect as they supersede European National Laws. See generally M.
CHERIF BAsSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION 501 (2d ed. 1987). See also Mell,
supra note 37, at 158.
59. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 58, art. 8(1).
60. See generally DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
(1973).
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upon by the advent of technology, the Council of Europe (here-
after Council) began "to study potential courses for data protec-
tion legislation."6 This study resulted in a resolution passed
by the Council in 1974 which addressed the storage of personal
data. 2 The guidelines of the resolution subsequently became
incorporated in the Convention for the Protection of Individu-
als with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
(Personal Data Convention) in 1 9 8 1 .' It is this Convention
that formed the basis for what was to become the Directive."
The Personal Data Convention addresses data quality by
requiring that data be: (1) fairly and legitimately obtained and
processed; (2) used and stored for legal purposes; (3) adequate,
relevant and not excessive with respect to the purpose for
which it is stored; (4) up to date and accurate; and (5) main-
tained no longer than is necessary to achieve its purpose."
61. Peter Mei, The EC Proposed Data Protection Law, 25 LAW & POLY INT'L
BUS. 305, 307 (1993). See also Michael Roch, Filling the Void of Data Protection in
the United States: Following the European Example, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 71, 75 (1996).
62. See On The Protection of the Privacy of Individuals Vis-&-vis Electronic
Data Banks in the Public Sector, Council of Europe Res. (74) 29 (1975). The
resolutions requirements are that: 1) the public be informed about electronic data
banks; 2) information stored be obtained by lawful and fair means, be accurate
and up to date, and be appropriate and relevant with respect to the purpose for
which it was stored; 3) where information is private or could lead to discrimina-
tion, such use of information must be regulated and ensured by competent authori-
ties; 4) time limits be placed on the length of time for use of such information; 5)
individuals should know what data is stored concerning them; 6) precautions
against abuse or misuse of information are to be applied by administrative and
technical means; 7) access to the data should only be available to those with a
legitimate purpose; and 8) information for statistical use is to be released in a
way that prevents linkage to the individuals whose data was incorporated in the
results. Id. See also Cole, supra note 7, at 898 (listing principles of a progenitor
resolution addressing the private sector as 1) a person's private information, or
information which may result in discrimination should not be disseminated; 2) only
relevant information is to be stored; 3) rules regarding collection, storage and
dissemination of data are to be implemented; 4) individuals should know what
data is stored concerning them, where it is stored, and the purpose of the stored
data; 5) individuals should have the right to correct or delete incorrect data con-
cerning them; 6) access to the data should only be available to those with a legiti-
mate purpose).
63. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, opened for signature Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No.
108 (entered into force on Oct. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Personal Data Convention].
See also Tlrich U. Wuermeling, Harmonisation of European Union Privacy Law, 14
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 415-17 (1996).
64. See Wuermeling, supra note 63, at 416-23.
65. See Personal Data Convention, supra note 63, art. 5.
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Article 8 of the Personal Data Convention also gives rights
to individuals concerning their data by allowing them to make
inquiries into any data gathering organization which has files
regarding them; receive a copy of the data in readable form;
correct or delete false or otherwise improperly kept data; and if
the individual is denied access to the data or a copy of it, he
may request the data be deleted." As the Personal Data Con-
vention was not self-executing67 and lacked definitions, individ-
ual European countries implemented their own legislation with
requisite definitive terms." Because the various European
countries were at different stages of addressing this issue, for
some countries this meant implementing legislation,69 while
other countries already had appropriate legislation at the time
of the passage of the Personal Data Convention."0 Unfortunate-
ly, implementation of privacy legislation by European countries
at different times, and their use of diverse approaches, contrib-
uted to a lack of harmony between their laws thereby resulting
in provisions restricting the flow of data between countries.7
Although the European Commission (Commission) recom-
mended to its Member states that they ratify the Personal
Data Convention,72 it still had not been ratified in 1990 by five
66. Id. art. 8.
67. See SPIROS SIMITIS ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ
§1, at 122 (1992). Non-self-executing means that each Member state is required-to
pass enabling legislation for the Data Privacy Convention to become effective in
that state. See also Wuermeling, supra note 63, at 418.
68. See Mei, supra note 61, at 308.
69. Id.
70. Sweden was the first European country to pass a national data privacy
law in 1973. See Cole, supra note 7, at 902-03. Although the German state of
Hesse passed its first data protection law in 1970, it was merely state law and
applicable only to the public sector. Id. at 903. The German federal government
passed its national law on the Protection of Personal Data against Misuse in Data
Processing in 1977, which was patterned after the 1970 Hesse state law. See
Gesetz zum Schutz vor MiBbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der
Datenverarbeitung, 1977 (BGB1. I S.201) (F.R.G.). The seriousness of the German
authorities with respect to these rights is demonstrated by the applicable fines
and/or punishment one is subject to for violating them. For example, where one
obtains, modifies, or transmits protected personal information without a legal right
to do so, one is subject to fines or incarceration not to exceed one year, or, where
such acts are committed for one's own enrichment, or the enrichment of another,
or the purpose of the act is to damage another, incarceration of up to two years is
possible. Id. § 41 (translation from German is the author's).
71. See Mei, supra note 61, at 308.
72. See Wuermeling, supra note 63, at 419.
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of the Member states of the European Community.73 As a re-
sult, the Commission changed its approach by no longer pursu-
ing ratification of the Personal Data Convention.74 Instead, the
Commission published its First Proposal for a Data Protection
Directive,7" which, after review and comments by the appropri-
ate political bodies, was followed by the Commission's Second
Proposal two years later.76
In 1995, the Commission introduced the Directive in its
current form77 with the goal of securing an equivalent level of
personal data protection among the Member states.78 With
this goal, the Directive aspired for the elimination of obstacles
to the free movement of data across borders which could occur
due to inconsistent levels of data protection between Member
states,79 as well as the protection of fundamental rights and
freedoms in Europe.0 It is this commitment by the European
Union which shows that, although economic incentives were at
play, other major driving forces were social and political mat-
ters for the European Union.8' This belief was well expressed
by the French Data Protection Commissioner Jaques Fauvet,
when he asked, "Do we want a Europe of merchants or one of
human rights?"82
In recognition that the new information society required
the unimpeded flow of data, the Directive, per article 1(2),
sought to ensure the free flow of data streams within the Euro-
73. Id. at 420. The five countries which failed to ratify the convention were
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Id.
74. Id.
75. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of
Individuals in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, 1990 O.J. (C 277) 3
[hereinafter First Proposal]. The First Proposal was based on three main data
protection ideas which had already been seen in the Data Protection Convention:
(1) that limitations be placed on processing of data; (2) that there be transparency
to the data subject; (3) that there be safeguards with respect to data integrity and
security. See Id. arts. 6, 9, 18.
76. Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Move-
ment of Such Data, 1992 O.J. (C 311) 30 [hereinafter Second Proposal].
77. See generally Directive, supra note 11.
78. Id.
79. Common Position, supra note 11, at 2.
80. Id. at 3.
81. See STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW 23 (1993). See also
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 480.
82. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 480 n.61 (citing Commission nationale de
l'informatique et des libertes, 14e rapport d'activite 75 (1993)).
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pean Union rather than just the general protection of personal
data.' Article 1(2) states "Member States shall neither restrict
nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between Member
States for reasons connected with the protection afforded under
paragraph 1."' This additional requirement is reflected in the
change of the Directive's title between the First and the Sec-
ond proposal by the addition of the words "and on the free
movement of data."'
In order to achieve the free flow of data and the protection
of personal data, the Directive has as its goal an equivalent
level of protection of personal data among all its Member
states.86 However, in terms of data sent to third countries out-
side the European Union, the Directive changes its approach
by requiring an "adequate" level of protection, as opposed to an
"equivalent" level of protection.87
Yet another change in the Directive as announced in the
Second Proposal is that, in general, the Directive no longer
distinguishes between the public and private sectors, and thus
fosters the protection of individuals from both spheres.8 It is
precisely this protection by the Directive from both the private
and public sectors that marks one of the major differences
between the protection afforded Europeans and American citi-
zens-thus a reason that there is neither equivalence nor ade-
83. See Wuermeling, supra note 63, at 426-27.
84. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 1(2).
85. Id. at 31. See also Wuermeling, supra note 63, at 427.
86. Because of the different means of achieving protection of personal data
among the various member states, the best that can be achieved by the Directive
is equivalent, not equal protection. However, as long as the Directive sets a floor
that is acceptable to all the Member states, the fact that some of the states will
have higher levels of data protection within their own borders should not be an
obstacle.
87. Directive, supra note 11, art. 25(4) (Directive requirement of protection of
individuals in the European Community).
88. See Wuermeling, supra note 63, at 428. However, the Directives human
rights provision draws an important distinction between the public and private
sectors: human rights are concerned with the interaction between the public au-
thorities and its citizens, while the private sector deals with the interaction be-
tween individuals in a non-public sphere. See Directive, supra note 11, preamble,
para. 5.
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quacy of protection offered under U.S. law, as discussed be-
low.
8 9
C. The Primary Data Privacy Protection Goals of the Directive
An in-depth discussion of the Directive is beyond the scope
of this Note. However, a background of the approach to person-
al data protection of the Directive is required to appreciate the
disparity between the level of protection afforded under the
Directive and that provided under U.S. law, and to understand
how the gap may be filled with a contractual approach. To
achieve this understanding, a review of selected articles is in
order. The relevant articles are:
Article 1. This article defines the objectives of the Direc-
tive as protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of
persons with respect to the processing of personal data9 and
ensuring the free flow of data between the Member states.9'
Article 2. This article provides definitions of the following
terms and phrases: "personal data,"92 "processing of personal
data,"93 "personal data filing system,"94 "controller,"95 "proces-
89. See generally supra Section IIA.
90. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 1(1).
91. Id. art. 1(2).
92. Id. art. 2(a).
'[P]ersonal data' shall mean any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to
an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physi-
cal, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
Id.
93. Id. art. 2(b).
'[P]rocessing of personal data' ('processing') shall mean any operation or
set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not
by automatic means such as collection, recording, organization, storage,
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by trans-
mission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or com-
bination, blocking, erasure or destruction.
Id.
94. Id. art. 2(c). "'[Plersonal data filing system' ('filing system') shall mean any
structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria,
whether centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a functional or geographical ba-
sis." Id.
95. See Id. art. 2(d).
'[C]ontroller' shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or any other body which determines the purposes and means of
the processing of personal data. Where the purposes and means of pro-
cessing are determined by national or Community laws or regulations,
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sor,"96 "third party," 7 and "recipient."98
Article 6. This article establishes data quality principles
and requires the Member states to ensure that personal data is
processed fairly and lawfully;99 is collected for specified purpos-
es and not further processed in ways incompatible with the
original purpose;. 0 is adequate, relevant, and not excessive for
the purpose for which it was collected;' is accurate and kept
up to date; and reasonable steps are taken to correct or erase
inaccurate data.0 2 It also requires that data is kept in a form
which permits identification of the data subject for the shortest
time, and that data kept for longer periods, which will be used
for historical, statistical, or scientific use, have appropriate
safeguards applied to them.' °
Article 8. This article deals with special categories of data
processing and prohibits the processing of personal data "re-
vealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and.., data
concerning health or sex life."0 4 This prohibition is narrowly
circumscribed by exceptions' 5 dealing with: (a) party's con-
sent; O (b) authorized employment law purposes;0 7 (c) data
processing vital to the data subject's interest and subject's
the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be desig-
nated by a national or Community law.
Id.
96. Directive, supra note 11, art. 2(e). "[Pirocessor' shall mean a natural or
legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes personal
data on behalf of the controller." Id.
97. Id. art. 2(f. "[T]hird party' shall mean any natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body other than the data subject, the controller, the
processor and the person who, under the direct authority of the controller or pro-
cessor, are authorized to process the data." Id.
98. Id. art. 2(g). "[Rlecipient' shall mean a natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body to whom data are disclosed, whether a third
party or not; however, authorities which may receive data in the framework of a
particular inquiry shall not be regarded as recipients." Id.
99. Id. art. 6(1)(a).
100. Id. art. 6(1)(b).
101. Id. art. 6(1)(c).
102. Directive, supra note 11, art. 6(1)(d).
103. Id. art. 6(1)(e).
104. Id. art. 8(1).
105. Id. art. 8(2).
106. Id. art. 8(2)(a).
107. Id. art. 8(2)(b).
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physical or legal inability of giving consent;" 8 (d) processing
conducted for legitimate purposes and with appropriate guar-
antees by a designated organization relating only to members
of that organization, subject to third party disclosure only with
the data subject's consent;0 9 and (e) data which has mani-
festly been made public by the data subject, or data necessary
in pursuit of a legal action."'
Article 10. This article deals with the rights of the data
subject where the data has been directly collected from the
subject itself and provides that the subject be (a) informed of
the data processor's identity;"1 (b) told of the purposes of the
data processing;". and, (c) provided with the identity of recipi-
ents or categories of recipients of the data, whether the re-
sponses are obligatory or not, and the consequences of failing
to reply, the existence of a right to access and rectify data
collected, and the guarantee of fair data processing."'
Article 11. This article deals with the rights of the data
subject where the data has not been directly obtained from the
subject itself. It provides that the subject be supplied with the
following information no later than the time at which the data
is to be disclosed: (a) the data processor's identity;"4 (b) the
purposes of the data processing;" 5 and (c) the categories of
data concerned. It also requires that the subject be notified of
the identity or categories of recipients. Finally, it requires
notification of the right to access and rectify data collected, and
the guarantee of fair data processing."6
Article 12. This article discusses the data subject's right to
access the data collected about him. It requires that every data
subject have the right to obtain information, without excessive
delay orexpense, whether data relating to the subject has been
108. Directive, supra note 11, art. 8(2)(c).
109. Id. art. 8(2)(d). The type of organization is described as "a foundation,
association or any other non-profit-seeking body with a political, philosophical,
religious or trade-union aim," and requires "that the processing relates solely to
the members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in con-
nection with its purposes." Id.
110. Id. art. 8(2)(e).
111. Id. art. 10(a).
112. Id. art. 10(b).
113. Id. art. 10(c).
114. Directive, supra note 11, art. 11(a).
115. Id. art. 11(b).
116. Id. art. 11(c).
424 [Vol. XKV:2
PRIVACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
processed, the purpose of the processing, the categories of data
concerned and the recipients of the data, and if any automated
decision-making was made which might produce a legal effect
for the data subject."7 As appropriate, the rectification, era-
sure or blocking of data which does not comply with the Direc-
tive due to incompleteness or inaccuracies, is called for."8 Al-
so, subjects, as well as third parties to whom the data has
been disclosed, must be notified of corrections unless it is im-
possible or results in a disproportionate effort."'
Article 17. This article addresses the security of data pro-
cessing and requires that appropriate technical and organiza-
tional measures exist to protect the integrity of personal data
exist.2 ' Where processing is carried out by another party, that
party must also comply with such security measures.'2 '
Article 22. This article provides every person the right "to
a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed him
by the national law applicable to the processing in ques-
tion."2 2
Article 23. This article provides that "any person who has
suffered damage as a result of an unlawful processing opera-
tion ... is entitled to receive compensation from the controller
for the damage suffered." However, "Itihe controller may be
exempted from his liability ... if he proves that he is not re-
sponsible for the event giving rise to the damage."'24
In summary, the Directive provides for comprehensive
protection of personal data by ensuring four essential elements
of fair information practice: "(1) the establishment of obliga-
tions and responsibilities for personal information; (2) the
maintenance of transparent processing of personal information;
(3) the creation of special protection of sensitive data; and (4)
the establishment of enforcement rights and effective oversight
117. Id. art. 12(1). The type of legal effect in question here is one which "sig-
nificantly affects him and which is based solely on automated processing of data
intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his perfor-
mance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc." Id. art. 15(1).
118. Id. art. 12(2).
119. Id. art. 12(3).
120. Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(1).
121. Id. art. 17(2).
122. Id. art. 22.
123. Id. art. 23(1).
124. Id. art. 23(2).
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of the treatment of personal information."'25 Since these
broad protections pertain to both the public and private sec-
tors, they provide significantly more protection than those
offered to citizens of the United States, where the focus of
protection is only on public institutions. 12 As a result, the
protection of personal data in the United States falls short of
those announced by the European Directive."7
125. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8, at 13. It is interesting to note
that these four elements of the Directive, while more comprehensive, address es-
sentially the same concerns as the five principles listed in the Advisory Committee
on Automated Data Systems 1973 report on "Personal Data Systems: Records,
Computers and the Rights of Citizens." See Mell, supra note 37, at 159 (listing the
five fundamental principles of privacy annunciated by the 1973 report by the Advi-
sory Committee on Automated Data Systems).
126. See generally supra Section IIA.
127. See generally SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 8. It is important to
note that because the adequacy of U.S. data privacy law varies significantly from
sector to sector, it is inappropriate to attempt to answer the question of U.S. data
protection as a totality. Rather, there is a need to acknowledge that the protection
personal data receives in the United States may in some sectors be adequate
although it does not meet the spirit of the Directive, while in other sectors will
likely be viewed as extremely problematic by the European Commission. It is be-
yond the scope of this Note to provide such an analysis, but the assertion that
data privacy is inadequate to ensure the protection provided by the Directive is
easily verifiable by other scholarly works which have addressed this question. For
example, Professor Fred H. Cate stated that with respect to telecommunication
privacy "[elven in this highly regulated sector of the United States economy, Unit-
ed States law provides nowhere near the protection for personal data as is re-
quired by the data protection Directive .... This ... raises serious questions
about whether any other industry sector in the United States will be able to satis-
fy . . .the data protection Directive's adequacy requirement." See Cate, supra note
12, at 47. The seminal text in this area is Data Privacy Law by Professors
Reidenberg and Schwartz which was written for the European Commission as a
study of U.S. data protection law. This work provides a comprehensive analysis of
U.S. data privacy law and employs sectoral analysis that strongly suggests that
U.S. privacy law in general fails to provide the level of protection required by the
Directive, and certainly fails to do so in specific sectors. See generally, SCHWARTZ
& REIDENBERG, supra note 8. This sense of inadequacy of U.S. privacy protection
is best expressed in the foreword to Data Privacy Law by the renowned European
privacy law scholar, Professor Spiros Simitis, Professor of Law, Johann Wolfgang
Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, when he says that a reader of
Data Privacy Law may be left:
with a distinct feeling of disappointment regarding the state of American
data protection. Whoever has observed the processing practices, witnessed
the intensive debates on the necessity of regulatory mechanisms and read
the numerous both original and conclusive legislative proposals, will cer-
tainly expect more than the few islands of thorough regulation in the
United States. But the study shows also that there are realistic chances
for a quick development of comprehensive regulatory mechanisms fulfill-
ing on a broad basis the demands of the "adequacy" principle.
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III. THE FAILURE OF UNITED STATES' PRIVACY LAW TO PROVIDE
ADEQUATE PROTECTION AND ITS IMPLICATION ON DATA
TRANSFER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION
The failure of the United States' privacy law to provide a
level of protection for personal data adequate to meet the goals
of the Directive has serious implications for the future relation-
ship between the European Union and the United States. This
is necessarily so since the Directive has elevated the right to
privacy for Europeans to the level of a fundamental right.'
This right is not protected when data of European citizens is
processed in the United States. To ensure that there are no
privacy abuses, the Directive provides that trans-border data
flow to a non-complying country may be prohibited by the
individual Members of the European Union.'29 However, in an
age where data flows of personal and business information are
increasingly global, a blockage of data streams is likely to have
serious political and economic consequences.
The Directive, contrary to most domestic laws in Europe
which require an "equivalency standard" with respect to trans-
fers between Member states,130 requires that an "adequate
level of protection" exist when data is transferred to third
countries.3 ' The requirement by most European nations that
countries to whom they transfer personal data provide a level
of protection "equivalent" to that provided in the country of
origin is not to be confused with "equal" protection. This is
because the approach and language of the laws of the various
European countries differ. 32 The variety is understandable
when considering that the Council's Personal Data Convention
permitted a country's national laws to vary, and thus to exceed
the basic protections of the Personal Data Convention.3 ' Be-
Id. at x. For a discussion of the adequacy principle see supra Section II.B.
128. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 1(1). See also supra Section II.A.
129. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 25(4). The Article states that
'[w]here . . .a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection ...
Member States shall take the measures necessary to prevent the transfer of da-
ta... to the third country... ." Id.
130. The Directive explains that "the level of protection of the rights and free-
doms of individuals with regard to the processing of ... data must be equivalent
in all Member States." Common Position, supra note 11, at 2.
131. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 473.
132. Id. at 473-477.
133. Personal Data Convention, supra note 63, art. 4(1) (stating "[elach Party
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cause some countries have higher levels of protection than that
set by the Personal Data Convention, the citizens of such coun-
tries enjoy greater protection within their national borders
than in the rest of the European Union.
The Directive's approach of "adequacy" as opposed to
"equivalence" creates a lower tier of data protection for data
flowing to third countries outside the European Union. The
Directive's approach to determining "adequacy" is explained by
Article 25(2):
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third
country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances
surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer
operations; particular consideration shall be given to the
nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed
processing operation or operations, the country of origin and
country of final destination, the rules of law, both general
and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the
professional rules and security measures which are complied
with in those countries."
Determinations concerning the adequacy of data protection in
a third country will be made by the individual Member States
themselves in accordance with Article 25(1). 3  Unfortunately,
it is not at all clear what "adequacy" means in tangible terms
for a country like the United States which has no system of
oversight or registration, no independent data protection offi-
cials, and grants no legal rights to its citizens regarding access,
opposition, or correction of data in most sectors of private
endeavor. 3 '
Because the enforcement of the "adequacy" of data protec-
tion must be ensured by the Member States, a European Un-
shall take the necessary measures in its domestic law to give effect to the basic
principles for data protection set out in this chapter.")
134. Directive, supra note 11, art. 25(2).
135. Id. art. 25(1). Section One of the Article provides:
Member states shall provide that the transfer to a third country of per-
sonal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for process-
ing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance
with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of
this Directive, the third country in question ensures an adequate level of
protection.
Id.
136. See Cate, supra note 12, at 43-44.
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ion Working Party was asked to clarify the operation of articles
25 and 26 of the Directive. 1' This group, on June 26, 1997,
released a document which addressed both procedural and
substantive components of "adequacy.""8 While this "white
paper" offered insights into the Directive's adequacy require-
ments and suggested approaches for making adequacy deter-
minations, it failed to narrow the Directive's requirements."9
At the same time, the "adequacy" approach has also
sparked criticism from European experts who find it undesir-
able that data protection be lower in third countries than with-
in the European Union. This is especially so since individuals
within Europe are less likely to know what is happening to
their data in foreign countries.'40
Moreover, it is not clear whether the Directive's require-
ments set out a minimum (floor) or a maximum standard (ceil-
ing). Because one purpose of the European Union was to facili-
tate free flow of goods, capital, and persons, this goal is best
facilitated by having the European-wide law be the ceiling for
what a Member State can require of another Member State.
This would create no blockages of such free movement. On the
other hand, if the Directive sets the floor, it will permit the
137. Id. at 44.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 46. Professor Cate stated that:
[Slince the working party's interpretation of the Directive in no way
narrows the Directive's requirements, it comes as no surprise that United
States law fails to meet either the substantive or procedural data protec-
tion requirements identified by the working party. In fact, the working
party's . . . [interpretation tends to]. . . highlight, rather than ameliorate,
the differences between United States and European law.
Id. Because this analysis focused on telecommunication law, one of the most high-
ly regulated sectors in the United States, it is implicit that U.S. law in general
would not meet the Directive's requirements. This is especially so in areas of sen-
sitive data such as medical records. See also Patrick J. Mtqrray, Comment, The
Adequacy Standard Under Directive 95/46/EC: Does U.S. Data Protection Meet
This Standard?, 21 FoRDHAMi INTL L.J. 932, 991-994, 1016-1017 (1998) (maintain-
ing that U.S. data protection in many areas of the private sector, such as health
care and direct marketing, is inadequate).
140. See PETER DIPPOLDSMANN, KRITIscHE Jusniz 369, 377 (1994).
Dippoldsmann points out that it is inconsistent to require a lower level of protec-
tion for data being sent to countries outside the European Union thanithin the
EU because such transfers are riskier, less transparent and outside the jurisdiction
of Member states and, therefore, should require higher, not lower, data protection
requirements. He further suggests that the rationale for this "selective privacy
protection" is based on the interest in the free flow of data. Id. See also Schwartz,
supra note 13, at 485.
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enforcement of higher local standards. This is implied by the
language in Article 25(1) that "transfer[s] to a third coun-
try... may take place only if... [in] compliance with the
national provisions adopted pursuant to... this Directive."
And according to the interpretation of one European expert,
these international transfers of personal information will be
compliant only when they also meet the higher protection
standards found in the domestic law of the relevant Member
State.' If the Directive were indeed interpreted to set a floor,
than this would strongly suggest that U.S. legislation would
have to adopt the highest standard among the European Mem-
ber States to ensure ready access to the entire European Un-
ion.
While the free flow of information weighs strongly in favor
of interpreting the Directive as setting a ceiling, it stands to
reason that this approach is not desirable, perhaps even unac-
ceptable to Member States that have previously been leaders
in data protection, requiring them to relinquish rights they
have already ensured their citizens through local legisla-
tion-in many cases legislation enacted prior to the establish-
ment of the Directive. France and Germany, for example, have
placed pressure on the European Union to interpret the re-
quirements as a floor, expressing concern that interpreting the
Directive as a ceiling would significantly, if not totally, curtail
improvements in data privacy law in Europe.1
The seriousness of the Directive is emphasized in Section 3
of Article XXV which requires that the Member States and the
European Commission inform each other of cases where a
third country fails to provide adequate protection, 144 suggest-
ing that lists of countries who have violated the Directive may
be kept, and that data embargoes against specific countries
will be implemented. This inference is supported by the lan-
guage that the Commission "shall enter into negotiations with
a view to remedying the situation. 45
141. Directive, supra note 11, art. 25(1). See also Schwartz, supra note 13, at
487.
142. See Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the
Protection of Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445, 464-65 (1995). See also
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 487.
143. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 487.
144. Directive, supra note 11, art. 25(3).
145. Id. art. 25(5).
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The Directive does provide limited exceptions to Article 25
in Article 26 which permit the transfer of data to non-compli-
ant third countries.14 The topic of this Note is the exception
which concerns the execution of contracts to ensure adequate
data protection of data transferred between data importers and
data exporters. 147
IV. THE CONTRACT EXCEPTION
The Directive's exception to the requirement of data pro-
tection adequacy applies when the parties involved in the data
transfer have entered into a private contract. While this excep-
tion, in theory, provides a safety valve for private enterprise in
cases where national laws are inadequate to ensure adequate
data protection, it may be problematic in practice. Not only has
this approach been criticized by European experts, but it also
raises questions of practicality.
The contract exception to the adequacy requirement pro-
vides:
Without prejudice to paragraph 1, a Member State may au-
thorize a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a
third country which does not ensure an adequate level of
protection within the meaning of Article 25(2), where the
controller adduces sufficient guarantees with respect to the
protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and free-
doms of individuals and as regards the exercise of the corre-
sponding rights; such guarantees may in particular result
from appropriate contractual clauses.'48
The purpose of the contract between the parties is to fill
the gap between the Directive and the laws of the third coun-
try by having the European data exporter enter into a contract
with the third country data importer to ensure "sufficient guar-
antees with respect to the protection of the privacy...
rights... of individuals."'49 Given that it is unlikely ade-
quate legislation in the United States will be forthcoming to
reach an "adequate" level of protection, the contractual solu-
146. Id. arts. 26(l)-(2).
147. Id. art. 26(2).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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tion seems to be the only safety valve to guarantee European
citizens the requisite level of protection.
However, just as the disparity between "adequate" and
"equivalent" levels of protection had critics among the Union's
Member States, so does the contractual approach. Europeans
have traditionally had more of their lives subject to legislation,
such as health care and retirement pensions, so they are more
likely to see the solutions to social problems in the hands of
government rather than in the private sector. Thus, Europeans
are naturally skeptical about using a contractual approach in
lieu of legislation to ensure one of their fundamental
rights.5 ' A brief review of the use of contracts shows that
while the contractual solution has merit, it also has some sig-
nificant limitations.
A. An Analysis of the Contractual Approach.
To be effective, data privacy requires an enforcement
mechanism. In Europe, this mechanism takes the form of reg-
istration or oversight by state officials and employees in pri-
vate institutions. Any failure to comply with the national law
implementing the requirements of the Directive is subject to
injunctions and fines, and in some cases the potential for crim-
inal liability exists. Because of the existence of public institu-
tions and public or private individuals tasked specifically with
ensuring compliance with the Directive, a person who suspects
his rights have been violated has ready access to a remedy.
In comparison, the contractual approach requires a suit
charging breach of contract for enforcement. Because of the
high cost of litigation, this will likely lead to under-enforce-
ment of privacy rights, if not minimal enforcement of those
rights. In addition, the cost of creating a contract may be prob-
lematic for small institutions, especially when they have to
determine what additional protections are required to reach
the requisite level of protection.
This analysis is likely to be complex in a case involving a
contract in the United States where protection varies from
sector to sector, state to state, and is subject to different inter-
pretations by different courts. In addition, a European citizen's
lack of knowledge of what uses are made of his data in a dis-
150. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 491.
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tant third country with a different language, culture, and legal
system further compounds the complexity of the situation.
A brief examination of two situations where contracts have
been used to ensure personal data protection is instructive in
that it highlights both positive aspects and limitations of what
can be achieved with this approach. The first case involves an
Italian automotive firm, Fiat, and its French subsidiary Fiat-
France, while the second case involves the German Railway
(Deutsche Balm AG) and Citibank, an American financial
institution.
In the case involving Fiat and its French subsidiary Fiat-
France, the CNIL,'5 ' (French Privacy Commission), exercised
its data embargo power to negotiate a contract between these
two entities.'52 At issue was a transfer of data concerning the
Fiat-France employees to the main firm in Italy.' Because
Italy at the time of the transfer had not yet legislated its na-
tional data protection law, the French employees were not
guaranteed that their data would be protected in Italy as it
was under French national law.' In order that the data could
be transferred from France to Italy, the main branch of Fiat
was required to enter into a contract with its French subsid-
iary, obliging it to give the data the same protection it would
have received under French law.
155
While this approach seems perfectly adequate on the sur-
face, it must be recognized that once the data is transferred to
Italy, the French Privacy Commission lacks jurisdiction to
enforce the contract in Italy. 5' As a result, compliance with
the contract, and thus the assurance of data protection, de-
pends on either Fiat-Italy taking adequate steps to comply
with it voluntarily, or on Fiat-France auditing Fiat-Italy for
compliance. Both scenarios suggest difficulties. Even if Fiat-
Italy in good faith intends to honor its contract, if Italian law
does not require an equivalent level of data protection, it is
unlikely that Fiat in Italy will have staff who are trained to
151. CNIL is the abbreviation for the commission nationale de l'informatique et
des liberths. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 474 n.13.
152. Id. at 491-492.
153. Id. at 492.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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ensure compliance. If, on the other hand, Fiat-France audits
its parent in Italy and finds transgressions, it is difficult to
imagine that it would report its parent company to the French
authorities once the data has been transferred, much less sue
its parent company."l 7
The second case involves an agreement between the Ger-
man Railway or Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) and Citibank, which
came about as a result of public protest by consumer groups
and data protection authorities in Germany."8 The DB is a
monopolist railway that encouraged consumers to use fare
cards by offering considerable discounts.'59 The fare cards,
called the RailwayCard, were initially produced by another
German private company (Bertelsman) and were very popu-
lar.6 ° In November 1994, the DB entered into a Co-Branding
agreement with Citibank to provide the cards with a cash-free
payment function, thus making them VISA credit cards to be
manufactured in the United States. 6'
Protest by consumer groups and data protection authori-
ties caused DB and Citibank to renegotiate their agreement to
make the old style card available again as an option. 62 Howev-
er, it was widely believed that DB had sold data of its existing
and future customers to Citibank.'6' In addition, the German
data protection supervisory authorities criticized the applica-
tion forms for the bank card, which required personal data on
creditworthiness, since all the customers really wanted was to
get on the train and not to apply for a credit card."6
The Berlin Data Protection Commission became involved
and made it clear that the data was not to be outsourced to
Citibank, as this would result in a massive transborder flow of
data of German citizens to a non-EU country.16 Although Ger-
157. Id. ("A domestic exporter is even less likely to sue its home office or for-
eign partner to enforce the terms of an agreement").
158. See Alexander Dix, Case Study: North America and the European Direc-
tive-The German RailwayCard, Speech at the 18th International Privacy and Data
Protection Conference, Ottawa, Canada (Sept. 18-20, 1996) (visited Aug. 28, 1999)
<http//www.datenschutz-berlin.deldoc/intdkonf/18/bahn.en.htm>.
159. Id. at 1.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1-2.
162. Id. at 2.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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many had not yet adopted the Directive into national law, the
Berlin Data Protection Commissioner argued that no such data
transfer take place unless the parties complied with articles
XXV and XXVI of the Directive.'66 Because both DB and
Citibank were interested in continuing their business relation-
ship beyond 1998 when the Directive would be adopted by
Germany, they entered into a contractual agreement which
was deemed to provide "adequate" protection."'
The essential aspects of this contract were, inter alia, that
both parties agree to apply German Data Protection Law, 6 '
that customer data only be used for the purpose of manufactur-
ing of the cards,'69 and that the American subsidiary agree to
appoint data 'protection supervisors to ensure that German
data protection requirements were adhered to. 7° Significant-
ly, Citibank subsidiaries in the United States also agreed to
permit on-site audits by German data protection supervisory
authorities, including their nominated agents (such as Ameri-
can consulting or auditing firms).' The contract further grant-
ed rights to DB customers as third party beneficiaries and held
both the German Citibank subsidiaries and DB liable for any
violations by Citibank in the United States.' Finally, the
parties to the contract agreed to submit to the jurisdiction and
venue of the courts of Frankfurt am Main, and that the con-
tract would be governed by German law.73 One can safely
conclude, as Deputy Commissioner Dix did, that this contract
meets the objectives of the Directive. 74
Because this contract provides European citizens with
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2-3.
168. See Alexander Dix, Agreement on Interterritorial Data Protection, § 1, par-
as. 3 & 4 (visited Aug. 28, 1999) <http//www.datenschutz-ber-
lin.de/doc/int/konf1/intdp..en.htm> (stating: "protection shall be governed by the
standards as laid down in the German Federal Data Protection Law
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz").
169. Id. § 2, para. 1.
170. Id. § 6, paras. 1, 2.
171. Id. § 3.
172. Id. § 8, paras. 1, 5.
173. See id. § 15, para. 3 (stating: 'the parties hereto submit to the jurisdiction
and venue of the courts of Frankfurt am Main"). See id. §15, para. 4 (stating:
"This Agreement shall be governed by, interpreted and construed in accordance
with German law.").
174. Dix, supra note 158, at 4.
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adequate data protection and offers remedies, it could be used
as a model for other firms to follow in the future. However,
even though this contract meets the requirements of the Direc-
tive, that is not sufficient to conclude that contracts, in gener-
al, provide the correct approach to satisfying the Directive's
requirements.
B. The Shortcomings of the Contractual Approach.
Although the contractual approach provided an adequate
solution to personal data protection in the case involving the
DB and Citibank, what must be taken into consideration here
is the specific nature of the circumstances leading to this con-
tract, and the nature of the firms who were parties to the con-
tract.
First, both firms are quite large. Citibank is one of the
biggest and most well-known financial institutions in the
world. DB is, practically speaking, a monopoly controlling the
German Railway sector.175 Moreover, the amount of data in-
volved was large enough to justify contract negotiations be-
tween the firms, since there were in excess of 3 million railway
cards issued.'76 In addition, Citibank (banking) and DB (public
transportation) both operate in sectors that are very heavily
regulated. Consequently, both are experienced in dealing with
regulations and have regulatory staff to ensure compliance
with applicable regulations. Presumably, due to their size and
regulatory experience, they are more amenable to audits than
most firms.
Further, the contract was developed after there had al-
ready been an agreement between German and United States
banking supervisory authorities on transborder processing of
accounting data, which permitted the incorporation of that
agreement into the contract by reference to the applicable
laws.'77 Thus, the added step of looking at personal financial
data involved in transborder transit for compliance to the Di-
rective, in addition to financial regulatory standards, was like-
ly a significantly smaller burden than for a firm which does
not regularly look at data for purposes of regulatory compli-
175. See Dix, supra note 158, at 1.
176. Id. at 2. By July, 1996, 3,054,000 cards had been issued. Id.
177. Id. at 4. See also Dix, supra note 168, § 1.
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ance. Another factor that is unique to these firms is that fol-
lowing a change in German law, the Berlin Data Protection
Commission had just assumed jurisdiction over DB, and as a
result was able to participate in the discussion between DB
and Citibank, and presumably help with interpretation of
German law to facilitate the contract negotiations.78 Finally,
following the public upheaval after the issuance of the Rail-
way/VISA card, 79 both DB and Citibank had a very strong
incentive to reach this agreement.
It is quite unlikely that absent similar circumstances such
comprehensive protection can be achieved using a contractual
approach. It is probable that smaller firms in non-regulated or
minimally regulated sectors would not have the legal resources
available to determine the amount of protection necessary to
close the gap between the national law and the protection
available in the third country. Nor is it likely that the national
data protection authority would be able to assist a multitude of
firms from various countries with different laws to determine
what additional protection is required. As the deputy commis-
sioner of one European data protection authority noted, apply-
ing a contractual approach would mean that the data protec-
tion authorities would not only have to have familiarity with
the level of protection in a given country like the United
States, but would have to determine the data protection mea-
sures of individuals firms. 80
Given the complexities of ensuring data protection with
the contractual approach, it should be used as an exception
and not as a matter of course. In fact, even if there were no
inherent difficulties with applying the contractual approach,
there is still one overriding reason why the contractual ap-
proach is not a desirable long-term solution: it only ensures
data protection of European Union citizens. It thus fails to
make advances in creating data protection for Americans.
178. See Dix, supra note 168, at 2, 6.
179. Id.
180. See Dix, supra note 158, at 6.
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V. PROVIDING PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES-SOME OBSERVATIONS
While the primary purpose of this Note was to evaluate
the effectiveness of the contractual exception as a means of
meeting the requirements of the Directive, some brief observa-
tions concerning the implementation of increased data protec-
tion rights in the United States seem in order.
With the increased opportunities to misuse personal infor-
mation made possible by technology, it is imperative that citi-
zens of the United States also enjoy increased privacy protec-
tion. While the Directive provides excellent guidance concern-
ing the substantive nature of data protection, it is unlikely
that the highly bureaucratic approach used in Europe will find
acceptance here, given the American public's general distrust
of government and the general laissez-faire attitude of Ameri-
cans towards business. Thus, an approach must be found that
satisfies the spirit of the European Directive and is also com-
patible with American values.
Because Americans have traditionally been suspicious of
big government,'' intrusions into all areas of private life-be
they personal or regarding business-are subject to resistance.
Personal data protection is no exception. A 1992 survey by Lois
Harris & Associates indicates that 79% of the American public
is concerned about threats to personal privacy and 76% feel
that they have lost control over their personal information."2
However, a 1996 survey by Lois Harris & Associates reveals
that only 28% favor creation of a government privacy commis-
sion." According to this survey "although the public does ex-
press concern about how businesses handle personal informa-
tion, consumers appear more concerned about the actions of
government and would prefer to let businesses adopt voluntary
policies rather than have the government step in, except where
voluntary policies have been seen to fail."" In view of these
181. See generally supra Section IIA.
182. LOuis HARRIS & ASSOCS., HARRis-EQUIFAX CONSUMER PRIVACY SUVERY 126
(1992). See Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy,
and the Public Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431, 441 (1995).
183. LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS. & ALLAN F. WESTIN, THE 1996 EQUIFAX-HARRIS
CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY 36 (1996) [hereinafter EQUIFAX-HARRIS]. See also Cate,
supra note 12, at 33 n.253.
184. EQUIFAX-HARRIS, supra note 183, at 37. See Cate, supra note 12, at 33
n.253.
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sentiments, the establishment of a governmental privacy agen-
cy along the lines of the European Directive seems unlikely.
It is also not likely that American businesses are willing to
absorb the additional costs involved in complying in a Europe-
an-style system. These costs are incurred in diverse ways as a
result of the two ways European countries have chosen to
implement the Directive.
One approach is the registration of any data processing by
an institution as required by French and British national
law.'85 According to the registration approach, any time data
processing is to occur, the institution doing the data processing
is required to register it with the appropriate government
agency.'86 This register is available for public inspection, per-
mitting the public access to its data from the data proces-
sor. '7 Because the Directive requires that the individual be
given access to that data, and information about it, without ex-
cessive cost or delay,'88 the costs for complying with the Direc-
tive can be quite high. National legislation determines the
maximum costs that have to be paid by the person making the
request.'89 In the U.K., that cost is limited to ten English
pounds (roughly fifteen U.S. dollars), whereas the German Act
provides for free access to the information. 9 ' The British
Bankers' Association has estimated the cost of one institution
providing one customer with "a simple straightforward report"
containing the information required by the Directive to be
greater than 150 English pounds (roughly 225 U.S. dollars)
and concluded that the cost for a major bank to comply with
the Directive "runs into millions." 9' Perhaps the most im-
pressive example of the seriousness of the registration require-
ment is found under French law, "where the use of personal
data for reasons other than that set out in the ... registration
is punishable by criminal penalties."92
185. See Wuermeling, supra note 63, at 454.
186. Id. at 453-54.
187. See Directive, supra note 11, art. 12.
188. Id. art. 12(1).
189. See Wuermeling, supra note 63, at 446 nn.170-71.
190. Id. at 446.
191. Cate, supra note 12, at 15 (citing The Home Office Consultation Paper on
the implementation of the EU Data Protection Directive-The British Bankers'
Association Response, at 48-49).
192. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 492 n.150.
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The other approach taken to comply with the Directive, in
lieu of public registration, is to require private oversight. While
public institutions in Germany are required to use registration,
the oversight approach is generally used for private
companies. 9 ' Under this principle each firm provides its own
oversight staff in the form of a data protection commissioner
who is an employee of the company.' If the company has
more than five persons working on computers, one person must
be appointed to be in charge of data protection. 9 ' Large compa-
nies employ a full-time data commissioner while small busi-
nesses assign that function to an individual who has additional
responsibilities.'96
Considering the traditional distrust of government in the
United States, the oversight approach may not be embraced
initially. It would permit the creation of a relatively small
governmental agency whose role would be to work with indus-
try in creating the necessary regulation to protect the privacy
expectations of the American public. However, the majority of
persons involved would be personnel of private industry, thus
giving the entire approach a self-regulatory aspect. If this
approach fails to achieve the desired results, lawmakers could
still pass legislation necessary to achieve adequate results on
the basis of their experience with a semi-self-regulatory ap-
proach.
An alternative to legislation and the creation of a privacy
agency would be to treat private information as property, akin
to intellectual property. Although the right to private informa-
tion as such does not exist, it bears noting that the appropria-
tion of one's name or likeness for commercial gain, 9' now also
known as the right to publicity, was not thought to be a right
in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Co.9 ' in 1902. However, by
1905 this right was accepted in Pavesich v. New England Life
Insurance Co.'99 It was the advent of photography and lithog-
193. See Wuermeling, supra note 63, at 454 (citing SCHAFFLAND & WILTFANG,
BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ §§ 26(5), 18(2), 32 (1995), and citing Eickeler,
HANDELSBLATT, Nov. 12, 1992, at 4).
194. Id. at 456.
195. Id. at 457.
196. Id.
197. See supra Section II.A.
198. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
199. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
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raphy which made possible the capturing of one's exact like-
ness and the duplication of that image innumerable times that
formed the underpinnings of the right to publicity.
Just as advances in technology changed the legal para-
digm concerning the right to one's name or likeness and thus
created the recognition in one's property interest in the right to
publicity, so the advent of biotechnology, and mass storage and
processing, may change the legal paradigm applicable to per-
sonal information. The law may not necessarily recognize the
right to personal data as such, anymore than the right of pub-
licity was recognized in the absence of commercial gain. How-
ever, the law may in the future recognize a corollary right-the
right not to have one's personal data distributed to one's eco-
nomic disadvantage in the absence of permission to do so. This
approach would at least address the commercial aspects of
one's personal data.
The right to avoid the "appropriation of one's personal
data" could cover such sensitive areas as disclosure of medical
or genetic information which would disadvantage one in ob-
taining insurance and employment, or the sale of personal
information for marketing use. Personal information is often
only valuable when it exists in large quantities. Direct Market-
ing is such an example. Therefore, it may be argued that priva-
cy rights will be under-enforced because there are insufficient
damages to justify legal action. However, if suits can be certi-
fied as class actions, there would be sufficient incentive. Final-
ly, in particularly egregious cases, the courts should be encour-
aged to permit punitive damages to curb the misuse of person-
al data in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Directive may promise to protect the personal
data of Europeans within Europe, the contractual approach
stipulated by Article 26 of the Directive has been criticized as
a solution for ensuring that a European citizen's personal data
will not be misused in non-Member States. Additionally, be-
cause the effectiveness of the provision depends on the nature
of the data exporters and data importers, the contractual solu-
tion is at best a short-term solution. Since the European data
protection authorities are encouraged by the Directive to exam-
ine the adequacy of protection on a case-by-case basis, compa-
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nies for whom the contractual approach presents a less than
ideal solution, may still choose to use it as a demonstration of
a good faith effort to the data protection authorities that they
intend to protect European citizen's privacy.
Although the contractual approach is useful in aiding data
importers in the United States to comply with the Directive, a
different solution which protects the privacy rights of Ameri-
cans must be implemented since technological developments
will make individuals increasingly more vulnerable to personal
data abuse. It would be contrary to the most deeply held val-
ues of American society if immutable characteristics, such as
genetic information, were used to discriminate against individ-
uals and thus limit their aspirations and potential. If such
protections are not guaranteed, the protagonist in Gattaca, °°
who was denied the opportunity to achieve his potential be-
cause of unfavorable genetic information, will no longer be
fiction, but reality.
While the call for the implementation of data privacy regu-
lation may appear premature, 20 ' a reflection on a quote by Jus-
tice William 0. Douglas may suggest otherwise:
As nightfall does not come all at once, neither does oppres-
sion. In both instances, there is a twilight when everything
remains seemingly unchanged. And it is in such twilight that
200. GATrACA, supra note 6 (The protagonist in the film is determined to be
genetically inferior at his birth and is expected to have .a short life span. As a
consequence, he is denied the ability to pursue his dreams. He subsequently as-
sumes the identity of a genetically superior person, who has been crippled in an
accident. Once he assumes this false identity, the protagonist is able to accomplish
everything he set out to achieve, but was denied to attempt because of his genetic
profile.).
201. That regulation is premature is certainly the view of the Clinton Adminis-
tration. In a panel discussion of the Directive entitled The Internet and Public
Policy: Who's in Control?, the Senior Advisor to the President for Policy Develop-
ment, Ira C. Magaziner stated: "Ve made clear to the European Union, we do not
accept their approach to this . . . . [Tihe kind of government regulation that
they're advocating is too bureaucratic, too regulatory, will stifle a great deal of the
activity on the Internet, and we're not going to do that in this country." "The
Internet and Public Policy: Who's in Control?" A Panel Presented by the New York
New Media Association, FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 12, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Fednew File. He further expressed the hope that self-regulation
would accomplish the goals of the Directive, but if self regulation failed, the issue
would be subject to further review. What was clear was that the Clinton Adminis-
tration would not tolerate blockage of data flows by the European Union: "JI]f the
European Union tried to impose their system on us, and tried to block data
flows ...we'd absolutely protest to the WTO, as blocking trade flows." Id.
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we all must be most aware of change in the air-however
slight-lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness.e2
Michael W. Heydrich
202. Letter from William 0. Douglas to Young Lawyers Section of the Wash.
State Bar Ass'n (Sept. 10, 1976), in THE DOUGLAS LETTERS 162 (Melvin Urofsky
ed. 1987).
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